2026-06-26T11:22:10Z https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/oai

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/1 2025-11-20T09:42:07Z journal:cn driver

Obergefell v Hodges: Constitutional Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses G. Carter, Emily same-sex marriage living constitutionalism substantive due process marriage equality Fourteenth Amendment equal protection judicial review Kennedy jurisprudence In Obergefell v Hodges 576 US 644 (2015), the Supreme Court of the United States held, by a 5–4 majority, that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to license and recognise marriages between persons of the same sex. Delivered by Justice Kennedy, the judgment fused substantive due process and equal protection reasoning around a conception of marriage as an institution inseparable from personal dignity, autonomy, and equality. This case note examines the majority’s innovative deployment of dignity as a constitutional value, its deliberate departure from the rigid historical inquiry mandated by Washington v Glucksberg, and the synergistic interplay between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. It analyses the four powerful dissenting opinions, which condemned the decision as an act of judicial legislation detached from text, history, and democratic authority. The note critically evaluates the doctrinal legitimacy and limiting principles of Kennedy J’s dignity-centred approach, contrasts it with a potentially more orthodox sex-discrimination analysis under equal protection, and situates Obergefell within broader debates between originalism and living constitutionalism. Finally, it assesses the decision’s legacy in light of subsequent developments, notably the methodological shadow cast by Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization and the partial statutory entrenchment provided by the Respect for Marriage Act 2022. The analysis concludes that, while vulnerable to originalist critique, Obergefell remains a landmark affirmation of equal citizenship whose core holding is defensible on grounds more conventionally rooted in equal protection doctrine. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2023-04-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/1 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023): January-April 2023 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/1/2 Copyright (c) 2023 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/2 2025-11-20T10:42:12Z journal:cn driver

Medellín v Texas: The Non-Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Domestic Status of ICJ Judgments R. Marquez, Sofia self-executing treaties ICJ judgments Avena case Supremacy Clause international comity federalism presidential power separation of powers Vienna Convention on Consular Relations In Medellín v Texas 552 US 491 (2008), the Supreme Court of the United States held, by a 6–3 majority, that the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States) [2004] ICJ Rep 12 was not directly enforceable as domestic federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and that a memorandum issued by President George W Bush directing state courts to give effect to Avena did not constitute valid federal law capable of pre-empting state procedural rules. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court dramatically reaffirmed the non-self-executing character of certain treaties and sharply limited the domestic legal force of ICJ decisions under the United Nations Charter and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This case note examines the majority’s textualist treaty-analysis framework, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, and the Court’s refusal to accord automatic domestic effect to ICJ judgments notwithstanding Article 94(1) of the UN Charter. It analyses the dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens, Souter (joined by Ginsburg and Breyer JJ), and Breyer, which emphasised international comity, the Supremacy Clause, and the United States’ treaty obligations. The note critically evaluates the decision’s implications for separation of powers, federalism, the political question doctrine, and the credibility of the United States in international law, particularly in light of subsequent ICJ proceedings and the eventual withdrawal from the Optional Protocol in 2005. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2023-04-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/2 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023): January-April 2023 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/2/3 Copyright (c) 2023 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/3 2025-11-20T11:34:34Z journal:BR driver

Peter Hay’s The Law of the United States: An Introduction R. Baptiste, Dwayne Book Review American Law Peter Hay’s The Law of the United States: An Introduction, published by Routledge in January 2017, originated as a German-language text titled Einführung in das Recht der USA before appearing in an English translation prepared by two of Hay’s former students. At slightly more than 350 pages, the volume addresses an audience that the author himself describes in the preface as primarily non-American lawyers, scholars, and advanced students who require a systematic first encounter with a legal system that differs profoundly from the civil-law tradition in which most of them were trained. A secondary readership consists of American-trained lawyers or academics who seek a concise comparative overview. The book therefore occupies a somewhat unusual position in the English-language literature on American law: it is neither a casebook for first-year law students nor a narrative history for the general public, but rather a deliberate attempt to present the essential architecture of the United States legal order in a manner accessible to readers accustomed to codified systems and abstract doctrinal categories. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2023-04-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/3 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023): January-April 2023 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/3/4 Copyright (c) 2023 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/4 2025-11-24T07:12:32Z journal:ART driver

Recalibrating Constitutional Interpretation: The Post-Pandemic Expansion of Executive Power Rajan Namboothiri, Athul Executive Power Constitutional Governance Emergency Powers Judicial Review COVID-19 Legislative Oversigh Separation of Powers Comparative Constitutional Law Democratic Accountability States of Emergency The COVID-19 pandemic triggered an unprecedented expansion of executive authority across global constitutional systems, renewing debates over whether emergencies produce an “unbound” executive or reveal the enduring strength of checks and balances. This article challenges crisis-driven “Schmittian” assumptions by conducting a comparative constitutional analysis of five jurisdictions—Germany, South Africa, and Brazil—to evaluate how judicial, legislative, and subnational institutions shaped, constrained, or facilitated executive action during the pandemic. The findings show that although executives exercised broad emergency powers, most remained substantially “bound” by constitutional principles, with courts, parliaments, and federal units actively moderating executive overreach. Judicial independence, legislative oversight mechanisms, federalism-based resistance, and prescriptive emergency frameworks emerged as decisive factors influencing constitutional resilience. At the same time, variations in institutional strength and constitutional design produced significant disparities in constraint effectiveness, revealing latent vulnerabilities in several systems. The article argues that emergency governance reflects a process of dynamic recalibration rather than the suspension of legal order, and proposes doctrinal reforms—including clearer emergency clauses, mandatory sunset provisions, and strengthened ex-post judicial review—to fortify constitutional accountability in future crises. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2024-04-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/4 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2024): January-April 2024 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/4/5 Copyright (c) 2024 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/5 2026-03-18T08:48:45Z journal:ART driver

China’s Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) 2021: An Analysis Yi-Chen, Zhang Data Protection Privacy Law China Cybersecurity Law Data Sovereignty Algorithmic Governance Digital Regulation Cross-Border Data Transfers Consent and Transparency Data Localization Enforcement Mechanisms Comparative Privacy Law China’s Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL, Chinese: 中华人民共和国个人信息保护法) 2021 represents one of the world’s most comprehensive data-protection frameworks, introduced amid rapid digitalization, platform-economy expansion, and intensifying concerns over privacy, cybersecurity, and data sovereignty. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the PIPL’s architecture, examining its core principles, legal bases for processing, data-subject rights, obligations for personal-information handlers, cross-border transfer requirements, sensitive-data protections, algorithmic-governance rules, and enforcement mechanisms. Through a structured doctrinal and comparative assessment, the paper highlights how PIPL blends GDPR-influenced privacy norms with China’s unique governance model, characterized by strong state oversight, national-security imperatives, and campaign-style regulatory enforcement. The study finds that while PIPL significantly strengthens individual rights and corporate accountability, its broad state exemptions, expansive compliance burdens, data-localization rules, and regulatory opacity create substantial challenges for both domestic firms and multinational companies. Comparative insights with the GDPR, India’s DPDP Act 2023, and U.S. sectoral privacy laws reveal convergences in rights and transparency requirements but marked divergences in enforcement philosophy and data-sovereignty orientation. The article concludes by identifying key policy implications and proposing reforms to enhance clarity, predictability, and long-term effectiveness within China’s evolving data-governance framework. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2025-12-31 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/5 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): September-December 2025 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/5/6 Copyright (c) 2025 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/6 2026-03-18T08:50:44Z journal:ART driver

The Yes Bank AT1 Bond Write-Off: Examining Regulatory Authority and Investor Protection in India’s Banking System M. Patel, Akhilesh Yes Bank Investor Protection Regulatory Authority Risk Management Indian Banking Sector The Yes Bank AT1 bond case represents a pivotal moment in India's financial regulatory landscape, critically examining the complexities inherent in bank resolution, regulatory oversight, and the protection of investor interests concerning Additional Tier-1 bonds. In March 2020, amidst severe financial distress, Yes Bank underwent a restructuring plan initiated by the Reserve Bank of India. This plan controversially included the write-off of ₹8,415 crore (₹84.15 billion) worth of AT1 bonds. This drastic measure, intended to strengthen the bank's capital base, provoked significant outrage among bondholders, many of whom, including retail investors, were allegedly misled into believing these instruments were safe. The legal challenges that ensued culminated in a landmark ruling by the Bombay High Court, which declared the write-off illegal and invalid on the grounds that the administrator lacked the requisite legal authority to execute such an action. This decision offered substantial relief to affected investors, including Reliance Mutual Fund. However, the Supreme Court of India subsequently stayed the High Court's ruling and referred the matter to a larger bench for further review, prolonging the legal uncertainty and amplifying the financial ramifications for bondholders and the broader Indian financial system.  This research article delves into the origins and purpose of AT1 bonds, the precipitous decline of Yes Bank, the contentious write-off decision, and its profound impact on various stakeholders. It further analyzes the critical legal challenges and the ongoing judicial review, concluding with a discussion of the regulatory responses, systemic implications, and crucial lessons learned. The Yes Bank AT1 bond case underscores the imperative for enhanced regulatory clarity, robust governance frameworks, and comprehensive investor education to foster a resilient and trustworthy financial sector in India, particularly concerning high-yield, loss-absorbing instruments. It also highlights the delicate balance between ensuring financial stability through central bank intervention and upholding the rule of law through judicial scrutiny of administrative discretion. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2025-11-25 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/6 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): September-December 2025 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/6/7 Copyright (c) 2025 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/8 2026-03-18T05:46:16Z journal:cn driver

Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine: Article III Standing and Challenges to FDA Regulation of Mifepristone F. Bennett, Oswald Article III standing FDA regulation mifepristone post-Dobbs litigation REMS In Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), the Supreme Court of the United States held unanimously that pro-life physicians and medical associations lacked Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 2016 and 2021 regulatory relaxations of mifepristone, a medication used in early pregnancy termination. Delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the opinion emphasised that plaintiffs who neither prescribe nor use the drug, and whom the FDA does not compel to act contrary to their conscience, cannot establish the requisite injury-in-fact, traceability, or redressability merely by asserting moral, ideological, or policy objections to the drug’s increased availability to others. The Court rejected speculative theories of “conscience injury” from emergency-room treatment of complications and declined to recognise standing based on organisational expenditures or associational representation without concrete harm to members. This case note examines the majority’s strict application of standing doctrine as a jurisdictional gatekeeper, its rejection of attenuated causal chains in the post-Dobbs regulatory-litigation environment, and the concurrence by Justice Thomas questioning the constitutional foundations of associational standing. It analyses the procedural history originating in the Northern District of Texas, contrasts the lower courts’ expansive view of injury with the Supreme Court’s narrower conception, and evaluates the decision’s implications for administrative-law challenges, FDA authority over Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), and future reproductive-health litigation. The note situates the ruling within broader debates over judicial review of agency expertise, ideological forum-shopping, and the limits of “unregulated parties” seeking to constrain regulation of third parties. While preserving nationwide access to mifepristone under current FDA conditions, the decision leaves open merits questions and signals potential future scrutiny of associational standing and agency action in an appropriate case. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2026-03-17 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/8 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2025): January-April 2025 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/8/8 Copyright (c) 2026 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/9 2026-03-18T06:20:08Z journal:cn driver

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (Companion Case: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce): The End of Chevron Deference and the Reassertion of Judicial Authority in Statutory Interpretation under the Administrative Procedure Act E. Clarke, Madison Chevron deference Administrative Procedure Act Magnuson-Stevens Act judicial review statutory interpretation separation of powers In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce), 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the Supreme Court of the United States, by a 6–3 (or 6–2 in one companion) majority, expressly overruled the 40-year-old doctrine of Chevron deference established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the opinion held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, requires courts to exercise independent judgment in determining whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. Courts may no longer defer to an agency’s “reasonable” or “permissible” interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency administers. The decision rests on a textualist and originalist reading of the APA and Article III, emphasising the judiciary’s constitutional role as the final arbiter of legal questions. It rejects Chevron’s two-step framework as incompatible with the APA’s command that reviewing courts “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” The ruling is expected to reshape administrative law across environmental, health, labor, financial, and other regulatory domains by shifting interpretive power from agencies to courts, while preserving respect for agency expertise under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). This case note analyses the majority’s reasoning, the concurring opinions of Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, and Justice Kagan’s vigorous dissent (joined by Sotomayor, J., and Jackson, J., as to Relentless). It evaluates the doctrinal shift from agency deference to judicial independence, contrasts it with prior erosion of Chevron through the major questions doctrine, and situates the decision within broader debates over separation of powers, textualism, and the administrative state. The note further assesses Loper Bright’s immediate and prospective implications, including its interaction with recent precedents such as West Virginia v. EPA (2022) and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), as well as partial legislative responses. While the overruling restores a more traditional understanding of judicial review, it raises practical challenges for regulatory certainty and invites continued litigation over statutory boundaries. The analysis concludes that Loper Bright represents a landmark reassertion of judicial authority, doctrinally grounded in the APA and Article III, though its long-term stabilising effect on the administrative state remains uncertain. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2026-03-18 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/9 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 3 No. 2 (2025): May-August 2025 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/9/9 Copyright (c) 2025 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/10 2026-03-19T03:05:25Z journal:cn driver

Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] SGCA 16: Judicial Review of Executive Discretion under the Internal Security Act 1960 Tan Wei Ming, Adrian Internal Security Act Singapore constitutional law executive power ultra vires principle of legality judicial review In Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] SGCA 16; [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525, the Court of Appeal of Singapore delivered a seminal judgment on the justiciability of executive power in national-security matters. Although the appeals were allowed on a narrow technical ground concerning the validity of fresh detention orders issued after suspension under the Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed) (“ISA”), the Court’s obiter dicta fundamentally reshaped Singapore administrative law. It rejected the long-standing subjective test of review—whereby courts deferred to the mere assertion of ministerial satisfaction—and affirmed instead that all discretionary power, including that conferred by the ISA, is subject to objective judicial scrutiny. The Court famously declared that “the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power.” This case note analyses the factual and procedural background, the Court’s doctrinal reasoning and comparative influences, the swift legislative override via constitutional and statutory amendments in 1989, and the judgment’s remarkable afterlife. It evaluates the tension between judicial assertiveness and parliamentary supremacy in Singapore’s constitutional order, contrasts the Chng Suan Tze principle of legality with subsequent reaffirmations in non-ISA contexts (most notably Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] SGCA 59), and situates the decision within broader debates on the rule of law, justiciability, and the limits of ouster clauses. The note concludes that, while its immediate practical effect on preventive detention was curtailed, Chng Suan Tze remains a constitutional lodestar: a powerful articulation of the principle that no executive power is absolute and that the judiciary’s role in policing legal boundaries is indispensable to the rule of law in Singapore. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2026-03-18 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/10 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2025): January-April 2025 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/10/10 Copyright (c) 2026 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

oai:ojs2.modernj.org:article/11 2026-03-19T11:07:18Z journal:cn driver

Trump v. CASA, Inc.: Fourteenth Amendment Interpretation, Executive Power, and Immigration Policy R. Castillo, Valeria birthright citizenship Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause immigration policy executive orders universal injunctions In Trump v. CASA, Inc. 606 U.S. 831 (2025), the Supreme Court of the United States held, by a 6–3 majority, that universal (nationwide) injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority granted to federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789. Delivered by Justice Barrett, the opinion addressed emergency applications for partial stays of preliminary injunctions blocking President Trump’s Executive Order No. 14160, which sought to deny birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause to certain children born in the United States. The Court expressly declined to reach the merits of the Executive Order’s constitutionality, limiting its holding to remedial scope. This case note examines the majority’s historical inquiry into traditional equitable remedies, its rejection of universal relief as lacking founding-era pedigree, and the synergistic tension between judicial power and executive authority in immigration policy. It analyses the three concurring opinions and the two powerful dissenting opinions, which condemned the decision as an abdication of the judiciary’s role in enforcing constitutional limits on the Executive. The note critically evaluates the doctrinal legitimacy of curbing universal injunctions, contrasts it with the complete-relief principle and class-action alternatives, and situates the ruling within broader debates on nationwide injunctions, separation of powers, and the Citizenship Clause. Finally, it assesses the decision’s legacy in light of subsequent class-action litigation and the pending merits review of birthright citizenship, concluding that while the holding restores historical limits on judicial remedies, it risks fragmenting constitutional protections in immigration enforcement and underscores the fragility of executive reinterpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. IndraStra Global Publishing Solutions Inc. 2026-03-19 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/11 Modern Jurisprudence; Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): September-December 2025 3071-1223 en https://modernj.org/index.php/journal/article/view/11/11 Copyright (c) 2025 Modern Jurisprudence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0